Earlier this week, the Supreme Court of Indiana issued a decision that was notable for several reasons. First, it was a rare 3-2 decision. Second, the post-conviction petition was granted relief. But for me, it was particularly notable because I was working at the State Public Defender’s office when cases like Charlie Leshore’s dominated our caseloads.

When Leshore filed his petition for post-conviction relief in 2001, it was the general consensus that after pleading guilty criminal defendants could challenge their sentences either through direct appeal or by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. If a defendant was tried and convicted, he could only raise a sentencing challenge on direct appeal. But if a defendant pleaded guilty, either option was available. Thus, Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2, which dealt with seeking permission to bring a belated direct appeal, was rarely a factor in P.C.R. petitions after a guilty plea, because the petitioner could simply raise his sentencing issues through the post-conviction process if he missed the deadline to file a direct appeal.

But on April 28, 2004, the Supreme Court of Indiana granted the State’s petition to transfer in Collins v. State, a case where the State argued the State Public Defender’s client was procedurally defaulted from bringing a sentencing claim in a P.C.R. proceeding because the petitioner failed to raise it on direct appeal.

Granted, the State’s petition to transfer was granted the day after the State Public Defender determined Leshore had no meritorious issues in his case. Nevertheless, this issue would have been on the State Public Defender’s radar, and one could have been confident in assuming that the Supreme Court was leaning toward adopting the State’s argument. Thus, Leshore probably should have been advised of this information at that time.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins was not handed down until later in 2004. The Supreme Court’s decision went as expected: the Court held that after a guilty plea where the trial court exercised any discretion at all — whether it be length of sentence, placement, etc. — the defendant could raise a sentencing challenge only on direct appeal. He could no longer raise such a challenge in a petition for post-conviction relief. For those that had missed the deadline to file a direct appeal, they could avail themselves of the procedure under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2 to seek permission to obtain a belated direct appeal.

I started working at the State Public Defender’s office in late 2005. Within a week or two of me starting in my new position, the Indiana Supreme Court handed down Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 2005). After Collins, there was confusion among appellate attorneys and the State Public Defender’s office as to how to proceed in cases where the time for filing a direct appeal had already passed. Kling cleared up the confusion. In essence, deputy state public defenders investigating the merits of P.C.R. petitions filed after the defendant had pleaded guilty were to determine whether the defendant had gone through the direct appeal process. If he had not and the trial court had exercised any discretion in imposing the sentence, the deputy state public defender was responsible for seeking permission to file a belated direct appeal if the client wished to challenge his sentence.

Unfortunately, clients like Charlie Leshore, whose cases were effectively closed by the State Public Defender’s office before Collins and Kling were handed down were left unaware of the potential relief available through Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2. Leshore’s case is particularly noteworthy because he did not learn of this avenue of relief until 2021, fifteen years after Kling was decided.

Leshore will now have his sentence reviewed on direct appeal. He is set to be released in April 2029.