Indiana’s Speedy Trial Rule and Court Congestion

Yesterday the Supreme Court of Indiana issued its opinion in a case I argued in January 2024: William Grimes v. State. Criminal defendants have both a state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. In Indiana, Indiana Criminal Rule 4 helps ensure that defendants receive a speedy trial.

Under Criminal Rule 4(B), defendants who are in jail awaiting trial may ask for an early trial. If they exercise that option, the trial court must schedule the defendant’s trial within 70 days from the date of the request. There are exceptions, however. The exception applicable to Grimes’ case is when there is not sufficient time to try the case within 70 days due to congestion of the court’s calendar. In other words, where the court’s calendar is already full.

Here, Grimes requested an early trial, and a trial date was scheduled within the 70-day time period, on December 19, 2022. But on December 6th, the trial court continued Grimes’ trial until January 25, 2023, outside the 70-day time period. The court’s order merely stated the continuance was “[d]ue to Court congestion.”

When a trial court makes a finding of congestion of the court calendar, the finding is presumed to be valid. But the presumption of validity is rebuttable. If a defendant wishes to challenge the finding of congestion, the defendant has two requirements he must meet. First, he must object to the continuance at the earliest opportunity. If the trial court overrules the objection, the defendant must next file a motion for discharge, alleging the congestion finding was either factually or legally inaccurate.

The defendant’s burden of proof is merely a prima facie showing, which is a fairly low burden to meet. If the defendant can make such a showing, the burden shifts to the trial court to explain the congestion and justify the delay. Where the trial court explains the congestion and justifies the delay, the defendant’s burden at that point is very high: the defendant must show the trial court committed clear error.

Turning to Grimes’ case, after the trial court continued his trial outside the 70-day time period, the very next day Grimes filed an objection to the continuance. When his objection was overruled, Grimes waited until the 70-day deadline had run and filed his motion for discharge.

In his motion to discharge, Grimes indicated that the trial court clerk told Grimes’ attorney that no jury trials were scheduled the week Grimes’ original trial was scheduled and no jurors were summoned. Grimes also attached to the motion for discharge a printout, dated December 15, 2022, showing the court’s calendar for the week of Grimes’ original jury trial. The printout revealed that no trials that would take priority over Grimes’ case were scheduled for the week of Grimes’ original trial date.

Grimes’ motion for discharge was denied, and the trial court declined to provide any further explanation of the court congestion. On appeal, Grimes argued that his motion for discharge should have been granted because he had established a prima facie showing that the congestion was either factually or legally inaccurate, and the trial court failed to satisfy its burden of proof by explaining the congestion and justifying the delay.

In a 3-2 opinion from the Indiana Supreme Court, the majority agreed with Grimes. The dispute between the majority and the dissent focused primarily on one point: whether a court calendar printed out on December 15th, nine days after the court made its finding of congestion, was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that the congestion finding was inaccurate. The dissent argued that Grimes could only make that showing with evidence regarding the status of the court’s calendar on the day the congestion finding was made. The dissent argued that court calendars frequently change, and there could have been a congestion on the date the trial was continued, but the congestion could have cleared by December 15th.

The majority held that, while the court’s calendar from the same day as the continuance would be ideal, a printout of the calendar after the continuance but before expiration of the 70-day period is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing.

Both the majority and the dissent advised trial courts that the best practice is, in the initial order finding congestion, to explain the source of the congestion. In practice, this is the way most trial courts handle this issue. It is not unusual to see an order of congestion that provides the case names and cause numbers that are scheduled for trial on the same day.

But if a trial court makes a finding of congestion and does not explain the source of the congestion, here are some tips for practitioners. First, immediately file an objection to the continuance if you believe there is no congestion of the court calendar. Also, obtain a printout of the court’s calendar as soon as possible and certainly no later than the expiration of the applicable time period under Indiana Criminal Rule 4. Finally, if the objection to the continuance is overruled, file a motion for discharge and attach the printout of the court calendar, any affidavits you may have obtained from court staff, etc.