Zachariah Wright killed someone during a burglary. The State sought to have Wright sentenced to death. Two death-qualified counsel entered their appearances, but Wright wanted his former attorney. Later, when he was still unhappy with his counsel, Wright began asking to represent himself.

After a very long colloquy with Wright about his reasons for wanting to represent himself, the trial court denied Wright’s motion, finding that Wright was equivocal in his request. Wright did not really want to represent himself; rather, he just wanted different counsel.

Wright was found guilty and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On direct appeal, Wright argued the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself. After walking through the historical background on the constitutional right to self-representation, including a deep dive into the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta v. California, the Indiana Supreme Court held the trial court’s denial of Wright’s request to act as his own attorney was proper.

The majority - Justices Goff and David, and Chief Justice Rush - broke new Faretta ground and held that because capital and LWOP cases have the most serious consequences for criminal defendants, courts should weigh a defendant’s request to represent himself with a particular focus on the State’s interest in heightened reliability in the fairness of the proceedings. In practice, trial courts should hold a presumption against waiver and should be ready to appoint standby counsel even where the defendant is permitted to represent himself.

Justice Massa concurred with the majority result because he believed Wright’s waiver of counsel was equivocal. However, he agreed with Justice Slaughter, who dissented, that the majority’s decision seems to contradict the High Court’s decision in Faretta.

The decision is not only ripe for a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court because of its unusual application of Faretta. The decision also raises a lot of questions for Indiana criminal defendants, even in non-capital/LWOP cases. The Court’s holding rested on the serious consequences - death or a life sentence - if the defendant lost at trial. But what about defendants who are facing de facto life sentences due to their age, the level of felony, a habitual offender enhancement, etc.? Should the opportunity for a defendant in that situation to represent himself be subject to this new “heightened-reliability” Faretta standard?

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision can be found here.