Indiana Supreme Court Reframes Self-Defense in Antonio Turner v. State
Writing for the Court, Justice Molter describes Antonio Turner’s case as being about “a good guy with a gun shooting a bad guy with a gun,” where Turner’s only choices were “a felony or a funeral” under the trial court’s interpretation of Indiana’s self-defense law.
At the time of the incident, Antonio Turner was a college student. He was at a classmate’s house studying for an upcoming organic chemistry exam. The classmate’s jealous boyfriend, Dequan Briscoe, learned that Turner was at his girlfriend’s house and threatened to “pull up” on Turner. Hearing the threats, Turner walked outside to his car to retrieve his firearm. As he did so, he heard a car rev its engine, speed down the street towards him, and stop right in front of the classmate’s driveway.
Turner did not know for sure that Briscoe was driving the car, because it was dark out and the car’s windows were darkly tinted. When the vehicle abruptly stopped near Turner in the driveway, Turner turned and fired four shots into the car. Two of the shots struck Briscoe, who was indeed driving the car.
After Briscoe drove off to seek treatment for his injuries, police discovered on the passenger seat of Briscoe’s car a blood-soaked unholstered gun.
The State charged Turner with Level 5 felony battery with a deadly weapon. The parties agreed to try the case to the judge (a bench trial) rather than a jury. This will prove to have been the right decision, as I’ll discuss later.
Turner argued that he shot Briscoe in self-defense. At the conclusion of trial, the judge found that in hindsight it was clear that Briscoe was going to seriously harm or kill Turner. However, the court found that because Turner did not know at the time he shot Briscoe that Briscoe was going to seriously harm him, he did not act in self-defense.
To understand how the judge came to this conclusion, you must first understand how Indiana’s self-defense law applies. The defense is a justification for conduct that would otherwise be criminal. For one to be justified in using deadly force to protect himself, the following must be true: the person must believe he was protecting himself from a threat of serious bodily harm (meaning he cannot have used force merely out of anger, revenge, etc.); that belief must be objectively reasonable (i.e., a reasonable person would also believe there was a threat of serious bodily harm); the threat was imminent and required force, and the force ultimately used was proportional.
In other words, a defendant’s subjective belief of a threat of serious bodily harm is not enough; his belief must also be objectively reasonable. This has been practitioners’ understanding of the law until this decision; to be justified in using force in self-defense, a defendant’s subjective belief that there was an imminent threat of serious bodily harm must have also been objectively reasonable.
This is why the trial court found Turner guilty: the court found that a lack of awareness as to who was driving the vehicle at the time and whether that person posed a threat of serious bodily harm was not an objectively reasonable belief that there was a threat of serious bodily harm. Notably, the trial court agreed with Turner that, in hindsight, Turner made the right decision: his subjective belief that there was a threat of serious bodily harm was correct.
However, the trial court, and on appeal the Court of Appeals, concluded the following: while it was necessary for Turner to use deadly force to protect himself, it was not objectively reasonable, because the necessity to act was only apparent to Turner in hindsight.
The Supreme Court of Indiana accepted transfer of the case to address an issue that had not been analyzed before: what happens where hindsight confirms a defendant’s subjective belief that force was necessary to protect himself?
The Court briefly provided background on Indiana’s self-defense law. It then explained the role hindsight plays in applying the law. With respect to the “objectively reasonable belief” element, the Court explained that objective reasonableness is always evaluated prospectively. Hindsight is not used. Thus, courts determine whether, at the time the force is used, a reasonable person would believe that he was facing an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.
Let’s take this case and change the facts somewhat to show what this would look like in practice. Assume Turner knew that Briscoe was driving the vehicle that night, but Briscoe did not have a firearm in his vehicle. Hindsight may show that Turner’s belief of a threat of serious bodily harm was mistaken, but Turner would still have been justified in using force because the belief that he was facing a threat of serious bodily harm from Briscoe would have been objectively reasonable.
But we know that the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the majority of the Supreme Court held that Turner’s belief at the time was not objectively reasonable. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court cited to the last sentence in the self-defense statute to provide an alternative to the “objectively reasonable belief” element. The last sentence of the statute provides, “No person . . . shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person . . . by reasonable means necessary.” IC 35-41-3-2(c).
Here is where hindsight plays a role. The Court held that this final sentence demonstrates that if in hindsight we learn that the defendant was in actual danger and his belief that he was facing an imminent threat of serious bodily harm was correct, his use of force will be justified because his subjective fear was correct. Stated differently, the issue of whether his fear was objectively reasonable is irrelevant if, in hindsight, the defendant was in actual danger.
The Court noted that this was not a novel interpretation of Indiana’s self-defense law, but practitioners probably disagree. This creates a new standard for determining whether the defense of self-defense applies. Below is my attempt to boil this new standard down to a list of elements:
A person is justified in using force when:
the person believed he was protecting himself from a threat of serious bodily harm, and the threat was either objectively reasonable or, in hindsight, the person’s subjective belief turned out to be correct;
the threat was imminent;
the threat required force; and
the force applied was proportional.
A couple of notes about this case. First, the concurring opinion was a bit of a headscratcher for me. Justice Goff agreed with the majority that Turner’s conviction should be reversed, but he took issue with this new “hindsight” element. Instead, Justice Goff argued that Turner’s belief that a threat existed was objectively reasonable. In other words, Justice Goff believed that even though Turner did not know who was driving the vehicle that night and did not know that Briscoe was armed, it was objectively reasonable to believe that Turner was facing an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.
Again, let’s change the facts a bit. Let’s assume that Briscoe was not driving the vehicle. What if the driver actually lived in the neighborhood, was returning home that night, and was upset that Turner had parked his vehicle on the street? Would Turner have been justified in shooting that person? Under Justice Goff’s argument, he would have been.
One final note. Would the Indiana Supreme Court have reviewed this case if Turner had been tried to a jury? I doubt it. In several places in the opinion, the Court cites to statements made by the trial court that reflected the court’s factual findings and application of the self-defense statute to those facts. One of the factual findings was the trial court’s finding that Briscoe was not credible when he said that he did not unholster his firearm that evening. The unholstering of the firearm certainly heightened the actual threat Briscoe posed, which had a direct impact on whether, in hindsight, Turner was facing actual danger.
We do not get factual findings from juries. Instead, if this case had been tried to a jury, we would only know that the jury found Turner guilty. We would not know why the jury rejected Turner’s self-defense claim. It could have been because the jury did not find that Turner had a subjective belief that serious bodily harm was imminent. Or the jury may not have believed Turner’s belief was objectively reasonable. Or the jury may have found Briscoe credible that he did not unholster his firearm and, thus, there was no real threat at all.
On appeal, the standard that is applied to reviewing a claim like this is that the facts must be taken in the light most favorable to the verdict. That means the appellate court would likely have assumed the jury believed Briscoe that he did not unholster his firearm. Thus, Turner would not have been able to receive the benefit of hindsight. Kudos to the trial counsel who correctly tried this case to the judge, rather than a jury.