Last week, the Supreme Court of Indiana handed down a decision, Dustin Lane v. State, clarifying its role in reviewing criminal sentences. The facts of the case are pretty straightforward. Despite there being a no-contact order forbidding Lane from contacting his ex-wife, A.N., Lane corresponded back and forth with A.N. while he was in the D.O.C. At the time, Lane was serving a sentence for battering A.N.

At some point, A.N. stopped responding to Lane’s letters because she felt he was returning to his “manipulation tactics” that had marred their prior relationship. A.N. reported Lane’s repeated contacts with her to police, and Lane was criminally charged with ten counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Lane pleaded guilty to all counts and was sentenced to 300 days on each count, all served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of just over eight years.

On appeal of Lane’s sentence, the Court of Appeals determined the sentence was inappropriate and reduced it to concurrent terms (a total term of 300 days). Even though the Court of Appeals did not note anything laudable in Lane’s character, it held the non-threatening nature of the offenses warranted downward revision of the sentence. Judge Kenworthy wrote a lengthy opinion in dissent. She argued the sentence was not inappropriate due to Lane’s history of violence, intimidation, and manipulation of A.N. Judge Kenworthy also noted the “protective effect” of the no-contact order should have been recognized.

The State sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted. In one of its most detailed opinions on the Court’s review-and-revise authority provided by the Indiana Constitution, the Court explained its rationale when reviewing sentences. In the Court’s own words: “Today, we advance our 7(B) jurisprudence by setting sentence review in the context of the policies and sentencing options that emerged from recent reforms to Indiana’s criminal-justice system.” Lane, slip op. at 6.

The Court reminded practitioners that it shows “considerable deference” to trial courts and looks only at the aggregate sentence to determine whether either the nature of the offense or the defendant’s character provides positive “compelling evidence” to overcome that deference. The Court described its review as a holistic approach, considering all the circumstances. But it noted that the two prongs — nature of the offense and character of the offender — need not both support sentence revisions. Rather, a strong showing on one prong for mitigating a sentence can outweigh a weak showing on the other prong.

The Court spent much of the opinion summarizing the context surrounding Indiana’s recent sentencing reforms. These reforms were driven primarily by the costs of mass incarceration of mostly nonviolent drug offenders.

Dubbing its reforms as fueled by a “smart-on-crime” approach, the Indiana General Assembly increased the penalties for several serious offenses while shifting the responsibility of managing low-level offenders from the D.O.C. to local communities.

The Court described the overall approach to reform as a separation of “the people we’re mad at from the people we’re afraid of.” Lane, slip op. at 9. In other words, public safety is of paramount concern.

Following that approach, the Court upheld Lane’s lengthy sentence because it was “consistent with the aim of Indiana’s criminal-justice system to separate dangerous, violent offenders from the community to protect public safety.” Lane, slip op. at 17. The Court essentially viewed Lane’s letters as possible continuation of his cycle of violence against A.N.

The Court was deeply divided on the issue, with Justices Molter and Massa dissenting. The justices generally agreed with the guiding principles and “broad policy context” discussed by the majority but disagreed with the majority’s concern about the seriousness of the letters. The dissenting justices also noted Lane’s aggregate sentence for writing letters to A.N. was more severe than if he had battered her instead.

Helpful information for practitioners:

• First, the Court overruled prior case law requiring defendants to show both the nature of the offense and the defendant’s character supported downward revision of the sentence. Now, only one prong need be supportive.

• Second, the Court provides practitioners a clearer picture of how it analyzes these claims. Using the Court’s own language, practitioners raising these claims on appeal should emphasize why the defendant may be someone we are “mad at” but not “afraid of.”