First Appellate Decision Applying Indiana’s Vacatur Statute

Earlier this week, the Court of Appeals of Indiana decided its first decision on Indiana’s vacatur statute. In 2017, Indiana provided human trafficking survivors with an opportunity to obtain relief from their prior adult convictions and juvenile adjudications that occurred as a part of their human trafficking.

Indiana Code chapter 35-38-10, Indiana’s adult conviction vacatur statute, and Indiana Code section 31-37-22-11, Indiana’s juvenile adjudication vacatur statute, allows trafficked persons to get their adult convictions and juvenile adjudications reversed if they can show that they were being trafficked at the time of their offenses.

Despite the fact that the statute has been effective for over five years, A.C. v. State may be the first occasion in which Indiana’s vacatur statute has been applied. When A.C. was only 17 years old, she was sexually trafficked by J.J. A.C. was forced to perform sexual acts on other people for money, which J.J. kept. On one occasion, J.J. contracted with B.R. for A.C. to perform sexual favors for money. When B.R. claimed he had no cash to pay A.C., J.J. got upset and robbed B.R. Later, J.J. forced A.C. to use B.R.’s credit card at a gas station.

A.C. was charged as an adult for Level 3 felony attempted armed robbery and Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery. A.C. eventually pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony assisting a criminal, in exchange for dismissal of the other charges. Everyone in court was aware A.C. was a victim of human trafficking.

Subsequently, A.C. filed a petition for post-conviction relief, seeking to have her conviction vacated under Indiana’s vacatur statute. To obtain relief, A.C. had to show she was a trafficked person at the time she committed the offense, the offense did not result in bodily injury to another person, and she was under someone else’s coercion or control when she committed the offense.

The State agreed that A.C. had proved the first two elements. Thus, the only issue was whether A.C. was under J.J.’s coercion or control at the time. The fact that A.C. was a child and J.J. was an adult should have made this an easy issue, especially given the fact that A.C. presented undisputed evidence that J.J. physically and mentally abused her.

Nevertheless, the trial court denied A.C. relief, finding that “the entire proceeding was unnecessary” and that A.C. could just obtain relief in the form of modification of her felony to a misdemeanor.

The Court of Appeals disagreed. Having held that A.C. clearly met the elements of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial. Notably, the State conceded on appeal that A.C. had proved her case.

The trial court gave a second reason for denying A.C. relief; namely, that it would be against public policy to find that A.C. had been controlled or coerced. In fact, the trial court made a rather bold statement that finding A.C. was coerced or controlled was offensive to real victims of coercion/control. Respectfully, it is hard to imagine someone more coerced or controlled than a female child unable to care for herself who is physically, mentally, and sexually abused by a grown man.

The Court of Appeals noted that there is no public policy exception to the vacatur statute. If the petitioner proves the elements of the statute, the post-conviction court has no discretion but to grant relief.

Given the State conceded that A.C. proved her case, it is very unlikely the State will seek transfer. This is a great first case applying the vacatur statute. You can read the Court’s opinion here.